History - Operation Overlord
When the orders came for Operation OVERLORD, the 502nd was tasked to parachute on Drop Zone “A” and
secure the two northerly exits, behind Utah Beach. The 3rd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert Cole,
was tasked to secure Exit #4, near the village of Saint Martin de Varreville and Exit #3, near the village of
Audoville la Hubert. The 1st Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Patrick Cassidy and 2nd Battalion,
commanded by Lt. Col. Steve Chappuis were responsible for destroying four concrete blockhouses with
German 122 mm artillery pieces located southwest of Saint Martin de Varreville.
On the evening of 5 June 1944, the Troopers of the 502nd boarded transport aircraft and lifted off into the
evening sky. In the early morning hours of 6 June 1944 over France, four battalion serials came in ten minutes
apart led by the 2nd Battalion and Regimental Headquarters. The leading planes, scattered by low clouds
and German antiaircraft fire dropped the majority of the 2nd Battalion outside of their drop zone and scattered
them across the French countryside. The Paratroopers of the 377th PFA Battalion only recovered one of their
six 75 mm howitzers after the drop. The fifty men of the 377th PFA Battalion who assembled during the day
fought as infantry in scattered actions. Troopers from two sticks of Able Company received the green jump
light too late and exited the aircraft over the English Channel. Some of the Troopers laden with heavy
equipment drown. One of these unfortunate Troopers was Capt. Richard L. Davidson the commander of Able
Company. Col. Moseley suffered a badly broken leg during the drop. Shortly after the drop he relinquished
command of the 502nd to Lt. Col. Michael H. Michaelis, the Regimental EXO.
Despite these difficulties, the Deuce consolidated elements of 1st and 3rd Battalions and continued on task.
The commander of the 3rd Battalion, 502nd, Lt. Col. Robert G. Cole, dropped east of Ste. Mère-Eglise. He
made his way toward St. Martin de Varreville. In the darkness, Paratroopers snapped toy “crickets” to identify
themselves as US Paratroopers and began assembling in small groups. The groups were generally mixed
and often far from their intended DZs. The men assembled groups for leadership and safety in numbers.
Seventy-five men, including some paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, gathered in this way under
Lt. Col. Cole and moved steadily toward the coast. Except for an encounter with a small enemy convoy on the
way, in which several German Soldiers were killed and ten taken prisoner, the group had no trouble reaching
its objective. Discovering that the guns of the St. Martin coastal battery had been removed and that the
position was deserted, Cole went on to Audouville-la-Hubert where his men established positions at the
western end of the causeway without a fight. About two hours later, at 0930, the enemy began retreating
across the causeway from the beach. The paratroopers, lying in wait, shot down fifty to seventy-five retreating
German Soldiers and at 1300 hours made contact with elements of the 4th Infantry Division. They had
suffered no casualties. Cole, having completed his mission, remained in the area to collect and organize his
battalion. By the end of the day he had about 250 men. With this group he was ordered into regimental
reserve near Blosville for the next day's operations.
Lt. Col. Cassidy, leading 1st Battalion, landed in the center of the battalion zone near St. Germain-de-
Varreville. He collected a small force mostly of his own men and moved toward the stone buildings on the
eastern edge of Mésières which were thought to be occupied by the German unit manning the St. Martin de
Varreville coastal battery. Without opposition the battalion secured the crossroads west of St. Martin near
which the building stood. Taking stock of his position, Lt. Col. Cassidy found that both the northern exits for
which the regiment was responsible were clear. He then made contact with a group of forty-five men of the
battalion who had assembled north of his own position and ordered them to establish a defensive line at
Foucarville. The situation to the west of St. Martin de Varreville, however, remained obscure. Lt. Col. Cassidy
kept a portion of his force in reserve to block any enemy attempt to break through from the west to the
beaches. A group of about fifteen men were sent to clear the buildings on the eastern edge of Mésières.
S/sgt. Harrison Summers rushed the buildings one by one, kicked in the doors, and sprayed the interiors with
his Thompson Submachinegun. On occasion he had the assistance of another man, but it was his drive and
initiative that kept the attack going. About 150 Germans had been killed or captured when the last building
was cleared in the afternoon. Lt. Col. Michael H. Michaelis arrived near the close of this action with 200 men.
This allowed Lt. Col. Cassidy to complete his D-Day mission of covering the northern flank of the regiment
and tying in with the 82nd Airborne Division on the left. While the fight near Mésières was in progress the
men of the 1st Battalion whom Lt. Col. Cassidy had sent to Foucarville in the morning had succeeded in
establishing four roadblocks in and around the town and had trapped and largely destroyed a four-vehicle
enemy troop convoy. Despite this early success the roadblocks were threatened all day with being overrun by
a superior enemy force that occupied prepared positions on a hill to the northwest.
The American situation was not immediately improved by Cassidy's move north, since he came up west of
Foucarville in order to carry out the plan of tying in at Beuzeville-au-Plain with the 82nd Airborne Division. The
company ordered to Beuzeville-au-Plain mistook the hamlet of le Fournel for its objective and became
involved in three separate platoon fights which created some confusion until dark. The Troopers then
withdrew to the south where they remained under enemy pressure during the night. Since Lt. Col. Cassidy
was unable to make contact with the 82nd Airborne Division, he committed the reserve company on the left
and moved up some spare riflemen to fill the gap between le Fournel and the roadblocks around Foucarville.
Even so the whole line remained very weak and the regimental commander, having already decided to pass
the 2nd Battalion through the 1st on the following day, ordered Lt. Col. Cassidy to pull back and dig in. During
the night the Germans facing the battalion's right flank at Foucarville unexpectedly decided to surrender,
apparently because the increasing volume of American machine gun and mortar fire led them to overestimate
the battalion's strength. Eighty-seven Germans were taken prisoner and about fifty more killed as they
attempted to escape.
With the occupation St. Côme-du-Mont the 101st Airborne Division began clearing the enemy north of the
Douve and east of the Merderet. Preparations began at once for an all-out attack on Carentan from the north.
In preparation for that attack on 8 June, the 101st Airborne Division grouped three regiments along the Douve
with a fourth regiment assembled in reserve near Vierville. The 502nd Parachute Infantry was in line on the
right flank from the junction of the Douve and Merderet Rivers to Houesville.
The causeway over which the 502nd Parachute Infantry was to attack was banked six to nine feet above the
marshlands of the Douve and crossed four bridges over branches of the river and canals. One of the bridges
was destroyed by the Germans. Difficulties in repairing this under fire forced postponement of the right wing
of the division attack, first scheduled for the night of 9-10 June. It was the middle of the afternoon of 10 June
before the 3rd Battalion, 502nd Parachute Infantry advanced over the causeway single file. The men moved in
a low crouch or crawled, and it took three hours for the point to cross three of the bridges. Then the enemy
opened fire from a farmhouse and hedgerows, methodically searching the ditches with machine guns. At the
fourth bridge a Belgian Gate had been drawn so far across the road that only one man at a time could
squeeze by it. Under cover of artillery fire, which all afternoon worked on enemy positions, this maneuver was
tried. Six men made it; the seventh was hit, and the attempt was abandoned in favor of building up additional
fire. Mortars were brought forward. The stalemate, however, lasted until midnight while enemy fire and a
bombing and strafing attack after dark took heavy toll of the thin battalion line stretched across the causeway.
After midnight, resistance slackened and three companies were able to filter men through the bottleneck and
across the last bridge where they could deploy on either side of the highway.
The center of the opposition seemed to be a large farmhouse to the west of the road on ground that rose
sharply from the marshes. In the morning of 11 June after attempts to knock this out with artillery had failed, Lt.
Col. Cole, battalion commander, ordered a charge which he and his executive officer, Maj. John P. Stopka,
led. Followed at first by only a quarter of their 250 men, Cole and Stopka ran through enemy fire. The charge
gathered momentum as more men saw their officers charging toward the enemy with fixed bayonets and ran
forward to join the assault. The farmhouse was not occupied but the Germans had rifle pits and machine gun
emplacements in hedgerows to the west. These were overrun and the Germans manning them we killed with
grenades and bayonets.
The heavy casualties and disorganization of the battalion prevented Lt. Col. Cole from following up his
advantage. Instead he sent word back to have the 1st Battalion of the regiment pass through and continue the
attack south. The 1st Battalion, which was near the fourth causeway bridge when request came to move
forward, reached Cole's position through heavy fire. But since it was as hard hit and disorganized as the 3d
Battalion it was in no better condition to move on. Both battalions set up a defensive line and held on during
11 June against determined German counterattacks, which on one occasion threatened to break through. The
2nd Battalion took over the line during the night, but the 502nd Parachute Infantry was too exhausted to renew
the attack and the 506th Parachute Infantry was sent to its relief. After the attack on Carantan, the 502d
relocated outside Cherbourg to conduct security duties. In late June, the 502nd sailed back to England in July
to absorb replacements, retrain, and await another mission.
secure the two northerly exits, behind Utah Beach. The 3rd Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Robert Cole,
was tasked to secure Exit #4, near the village of Saint Martin de Varreville and Exit #3, near the village of
Audoville la Hubert. The 1st Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. Patrick Cassidy and 2nd Battalion,
commanded by Lt. Col. Steve Chappuis were responsible for destroying four concrete blockhouses with
German 122 mm artillery pieces located southwest of Saint Martin de Varreville.
On the evening of 5 June 1944, the Troopers of the 502nd boarded transport aircraft and lifted off into the
evening sky. In the early morning hours of 6 June 1944 over France, four battalion serials came in ten minutes
apart led by the 2nd Battalion and Regimental Headquarters. The leading planes, scattered by low clouds
and German antiaircraft fire dropped the majority of the 2nd Battalion outside of their drop zone and scattered
them across the French countryside. The Paratroopers of the 377th PFA Battalion only recovered one of their
six 75 mm howitzers after the drop. The fifty men of the 377th PFA Battalion who assembled during the day
fought as infantry in scattered actions. Troopers from two sticks of Able Company received the green jump
light too late and exited the aircraft over the English Channel. Some of the Troopers laden with heavy
equipment drown. One of these unfortunate Troopers was Capt. Richard L. Davidson the commander of Able
Company. Col. Moseley suffered a badly broken leg during the drop. Shortly after the drop he relinquished
command of the 502nd to Lt. Col. Michael H. Michaelis, the Regimental EXO.
Despite these difficulties, the Deuce consolidated elements of 1st and 3rd Battalions and continued on task.
The commander of the 3rd Battalion, 502nd, Lt. Col. Robert G. Cole, dropped east of Ste. Mère-Eglise. He
made his way toward St. Martin de Varreville. In the darkness, Paratroopers snapped toy “crickets” to identify
themselves as US Paratroopers and began assembling in small groups. The groups were generally mixed
and often far from their intended DZs. The men assembled groups for leadership and safety in numbers.
Seventy-five men, including some paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, gathered in this way under
Lt. Col. Cole and moved steadily toward the coast. Except for an encounter with a small enemy convoy on the
way, in which several German Soldiers were killed and ten taken prisoner, the group had no trouble reaching
its objective. Discovering that the guns of the St. Martin coastal battery had been removed and that the
position was deserted, Cole went on to Audouville-la-Hubert where his men established positions at the
western end of the causeway without a fight. About two hours later, at 0930, the enemy began retreating
across the causeway from the beach. The paratroopers, lying in wait, shot down fifty to seventy-five retreating
German Soldiers and at 1300 hours made contact with elements of the 4th Infantry Division. They had
suffered no casualties. Cole, having completed his mission, remained in the area to collect and organize his
battalion. By the end of the day he had about 250 men. With this group he was ordered into regimental
reserve near Blosville for the next day's operations.
Lt. Col. Cassidy, leading 1st Battalion, landed in the center of the battalion zone near St. Germain-de-
Varreville. He collected a small force mostly of his own men and moved toward the stone buildings on the
eastern edge of Mésières which were thought to be occupied by the German unit manning the St. Martin de
Varreville coastal battery. Without opposition the battalion secured the crossroads west of St. Martin near
which the building stood. Taking stock of his position, Lt. Col. Cassidy found that both the northern exits for
which the regiment was responsible were clear. He then made contact with a group of forty-five men of the
battalion who had assembled north of his own position and ordered them to establish a defensive line at
Foucarville. The situation to the west of St. Martin de Varreville, however, remained obscure. Lt. Col. Cassidy
kept a portion of his force in reserve to block any enemy attempt to break through from the west to the
beaches. A group of about fifteen men were sent to clear the buildings on the eastern edge of Mésières.
S/sgt. Harrison Summers rushed the buildings one by one, kicked in the doors, and sprayed the interiors with
his Thompson Submachinegun. On occasion he had the assistance of another man, but it was his drive and
initiative that kept the attack going. About 150 Germans had been killed or captured when the last building
was cleared in the afternoon. Lt. Col. Michael H. Michaelis arrived near the close of this action with 200 men.
This allowed Lt. Col. Cassidy to complete his D-Day mission of covering the northern flank of the regiment
and tying in with the 82nd Airborne Division on the left. While the fight near Mésières was in progress the
men of the 1st Battalion whom Lt. Col. Cassidy had sent to Foucarville in the morning had succeeded in
establishing four roadblocks in and around the town and had trapped and largely destroyed a four-vehicle
enemy troop convoy. Despite this early success the roadblocks were threatened all day with being overrun by
a superior enemy force that occupied prepared positions on a hill to the northwest.
The American situation was not immediately improved by Cassidy's move north, since he came up west of
Foucarville in order to carry out the plan of tying in at Beuzeville-au-Plain with the 82nd Airborne Division. The
company ordered to Beuzeville-au-Plain mistook the hamlet of le Fournel for its objective and became
involved in three separate platoon fights which created some confusion until dark. The Troopers then
withdrew to the south where they remained under enemy pressure during the night. Since Lt. Col. Cassidy
was unable to make contact with the 82nd Airborne Division, he committed the reserve company on the left
and moved up some spare riflemen to fill the gap between le Fournel and the roadblocks around Foucarville.
Even so the whole line remained very weak and the regimental commander, having already decided to pass
the 2nd Battalion through the 1st on the following day, ordered Lt. Col. Cassidy to pull back and dig in. During
the night the Germans facing the battalion's right flank at Foucarville unexpectedly decided to surrender,
apparently because the increasing volume of American machine gun and mortar fire led them to overestimate
the battalion's strength. Eighty-seven Germans were taken prisoner and about fifty more killed as they
attempted to escape.
With the occupation St. Côme-du-Mont the 101st Airborne Division began clearing the enemy north of the
Douve and east of the Merderet. Preparations began at once for an all-out attack on Carentan from the north.
In preparation for that attack on 8 June, the 101st Airborne Division grouped three regiments along the Douve
with a fourth regiment assembled in reserve near Vierville. The 502nd Parachute Infantry was in line on the
right flank from the junction of the Douve and Merderet Rivers to Houesville.
The causeway over which the 502nd Parachute Infantry was to attack was banked six to nine feet above the
marshlands of the Douve and crossed four bridges over branches of the river and canals. One of the bridges
was destroyed by the Germans. Difficulties in repairing this under fire forced postponement of the right wing
of the division attack, first scheduled for the night of 9-10 June. It was the middle of the afternoon of 10 June
before the 3rd Battalion, 502nd Parachute Infantry advanced over the causeway single file. The men moved in
a low crouch or crawled, and it took three hours for the point to cross three of the bridges. Then the enemy
opened fire from a farmhouse and hedgerows, methodically searching the ditches with machine guns. At the
fourth bridge a Belgian Gate had been drawn so far across the road that only one man at a time could
squeeze by it. Under cover of artillery fire, which all afternoon worked on enemy positions, this maneuver was
tried. Six men made it; the seventh was hit, and the attempt was abandoned in favor of building up additional
fire. Mortars were brought forward. The stalemate, however, lasted until midnight while enemy fire and a
bombing and strafing attack after dark took heavy toll of the thin battalion line stretched across the causeway.
After midnight, resistance slackened and three companies were able to filter men through the bottleneck and
across the last bridge where they could deploy on either side of the highway.
The center of the opposition seemed to be a large farmhouse to the west of the road on ground that rose
sharply from the marshes. In the morning of 11 June after attempts to knock this out with artillery had failed, Lt.
Col. Cole, battalion commander, ordered a charge which he and his executive officer, Maj. John P. Stopka,
led. Followed at first by only a quarter of their 250 men, Cole and Stopka ran through enemy fire. The charge
gathered momentum as more men saw their officers charging toward the enemy with fixed bayonets and ran
forward to join the assault. The farmhouse was not occupied but the Germans had rifle pits and machine gun
emplacements in hedgerows to the west. These were overrun and the Germans manning them we killed with
grenades and bayonets.
The heavy casualties and disorganization of the battalion prevented Lt. Col. Cole from following up his
advantage. Instead he sent word back to have the 1st Battalion of the regiment pass through and continue the
attack south. The 1st Battalion, which was near the fourth causeway bridge when request came to move
forward, reached Cole's position through heavy fire. But since it was as hard hit and disorganized as the 3d
Battalion it was in no better condition to move on. Both battalions set up a defensive line and held on during
11 June against determined German counterattacks, which on one occasion threatened to break through. The
2nd Battalion took over the line during the night, but the 502nd Parachute Infantry was too exhausted to renew
the attack and the 506th Parachute Infantry was sent to its relief. After the attack on Carantan, the 502d
relocated outside Cherbourg to conduct security duties. In late June, the 502nd sailed back to England in July
to absorb replacements, retrain, and await another mission.
| A Company, 1st Battalion, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment |
| (Reenacted 1941-1945) |
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| General Dwight D. Eisenhower speaking to Paratroopers of the 502nd PIR at Greenham Common, England on 5 June 1944. |
| Paratroopers moving to thier aircraft on the evening of 5 June 1944 |
| 101st Airborne Division Drop Pattern, 6 June 1944 Cross-Channel Attack, Gordon A. Harrison, Office of the Chief of Military History, Deparment of the Army, Washington, D.C. 1951, CMH Publication 7-4 |
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| Contact us: info@ablecompany502pir.org |
| Cross-Channel Attack, Gordon A. Harrison, Office of the Chief of Military History, Deparment of the Army, Washington, D.C. 1951, CMH Publication 7-4 |