History - Operation Market Garden
| A Company, 1st Battalion, 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment |
| (Reenacted 1941-1945) |
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Operation MARKET-GARDEN had two major objectives: to get Allied troops across the Rhine and to capture
airborne divisions, to drop in the vicinity of Grave, Nijmegen, and Arnhem to seize bridges over several
canals and the Maas, Waal (Rhine), and Neder Rijn Rivers. They were to open a corridor more than fifty miles
long leading from Eindhoven northward to Arnhem. Operation GARDEN, called for ground troops of the
ninety-nine miles. The main effort of the ground attack was to be made by the British XXX Corps. On either
flank the British VIII and XII Corps were to launch supporting attacks.
The 101st Airborne Division was responsible for a 15-mile segment road of narrow concrete and macadam
ribbon stretching northward and northeastward from Eindhoven in the direction of Grave. The men of the
101st would soon call that segment of road the nickname Hell’s Highway.
The objectives vital for subsequent passage of the British XXX Corps were located at intervals along the
entire 15-mile stretch of road. The division commander, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, later compared the
situation to the early American West, where small garrisons had to contend with sudden Indian attacks at any
point along great stretches of vital railroad.
Recalling dispersion that had plagued the division in Normandy, General Taylor insisted upon drop zones
fairly close together, no matter how scattered the objectives. Two regimental drop zones and the division
landing zone were located near the center of the Division sector, west of Hell's Highway in a triangle marked
by the villages of Zon, St. Oedenrode, and Best. The 501st PIR, commanded by Col. Howard R. Johnson,
would drop to the north of the other regiments near Veghel onto Drop Zone “A” in order to seize rail and road
bridges over the Willems Canal and the Aa River. Gen Taylor ordered the 506th PIR, commanded by Col.
Robert F. Sink, to drop close to Zon onto Drop Zone “C”, secure the highway bridge over the Wilhelmina
Canal a few hundred yards south of Zon, and then march south on Eindhoven. Gen. Taylor tasked the 502nd
PIR, commanded by Col. John H. Michaelis, to land just north of the 506th onto Drop Zone “B”, guard both
drop zones and secure Landing Zone “W” for gliders, and to capture the road bridge over the Dommel River
at St. Oedenrode. Additionally, General Taylor tasked the 502nd to secure bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal
south of Best, four miles from Zon off the west flank of Hell's Highway in order to strengthen the over-all
position of the 101st. In order to meet Gen. Taylor’s intent, Col. Michaelis sent a company to these bridges.
delayed by this misadventure, by nightfall had brought a persistent bunch of rear echelon Germans to heel in
St. Oedenrode and thereby secured both a main highway and an alternate bridge over the Dommel River.
After deploying troopers to defend the village, Lt. Col. Cassidy sent a patrol northeast along Hell's Highway
which contacted the 501st Parachute Infantry at Veghel.
The majority of the 502nd moved to an assembly area near Zon as the Division reserve. At the same time a
H Company, 3rd Battalion reinforced by a light machine gun section from battalion headquarters and 3rd
Platoon, C Company, 326th Engineer Regiment .proceeded upon a separate mission, to capture the rail and
road bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal southeast of Best. Although these bridges were not assigned
objectives for the 101st Airborne Division, General Taylor considered them valuable for three reasons: first,
as an outpost protecting his glider landing zone and his main positions along Hell's Highway; again, as
alternate crossings of the Wilhelmina Canal should the Germans destroy the bridges at Zon; and again, as
control of a main highway (between Eindhoven and Hertogenbosch) by which the Germans otherwise might
feed reinforcements to Eindhoven. To do the job, Col. Michaelis sent Company H.
En route to the bridges, the H Company Commander, Capt. Robert E. Jones, lost his way in the densely
wooded Zonsche Forest. Emerging near a road junction southeast of Best, the company came under fire
from a small group of Germans. The Germans gained the upper hand when infantry reinforcements and
several small cannon arrived by truck from the direction of Hertogenbosch.
Goaded by radio messages from Lt. Col. Cole to secure the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal, Capt. Jones
organized a reinforced patrol. Lt. Edward L. Wierzbowski took his rifle platoon, the attached engineer platoon,
and attached light machine gun section to the bridges.
Lieutenant Wierzbowski found in turn that casualties and disorganization had left him with only eighteen
riflemen and twenty-six engineers. Lt. Wierzbowski’s reinforced patrol was picking its way through the
Zonsche Forest toward the bridges when night came with a cold, penetrating rain.
Based on stiff resistance north of Best encountered by H Company, Col. Michaelis directed Lt. Col. Robert G.
Cole to take his 3rd Battalion to Captain Jones's assistance. The remainder of 3rd Battalion started toward
Best at 1800, but darkness fell before they could establish physical contact with Captain Jones.
In the meantime, Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his men had crawled the last few yards on their bellies to reach
the Wilhelmina Canal several hundred yards east of the highway bridge. Slithering along the dike, the men
approached the bridge, apparently undetected. While the lieutenant and a scout crawled ahead to
reconnoiter, the main body of the patrol slid down the embankment to await their return.
A barrage of "potato masher" hand grenades came suddenly from the darkness on the other side of the
canal. Scared, a couple of men scrambled up the bank of the dike. Others followed. The night erupted with the
fire of machine guns and rifles. Some of the men stampeded back toward the forest.
When he heard the firing, Lt. Wierzbowski was within sight of the bridge and found it covered by German
sentries. Scurrying back, he discovered he only had 3 officers and 15 men remaining, and 3 of these were
wounded. Collectively they had their individual weapons, a machine gun with 500 rounds of ammunition, a
mortar with 6 rounds, and a bazooka with 5 rockets. As the cold rain fell, the men dug in for the night.
As these events developed, the 101st Airborne Division's D-Day glider lift began to arrive. Although not as
immune to mishap as the parachutists, a total of 53 out of 70 gliders landed successfully with 32 jeeps, 13
trailers, and 252 men. Of those that failed to make it, 1 fell in the Channel, 1 crash-landed on the landing zone,
2 collided in the air above the landing zone, 2 were unaccounted for, 4 landed in friendly territory, and 7 came
down behind enemy lines.
In Zon, the 506th PIR failed to secure the highway bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal before the Germans
demolished the bridge. Destruction of the bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal in Zon increased the importance
of the 502nd PIR’s mission of securing alternate bridges in Best.
On early D plus 1, 18 September, Col. Michaelis committed 2nd Battalion to the Best fight. The fight for the
bridges near Best developed into the 101st Airborne Division's stiffest fighting on D plus 1 and 2.
Behind an artillery barrage that began an hour after the first troop carrier aircraft passed over the British lines,
the XXX Corps had attacked on schedule with tanks in the lead. Against five German battalions, including
two SS battalions that XXX Corps intelligence had failed to detect, the spearhead Guards Armoured Division
made steady progress. The woods and marshy ground along the highway limited the attack to a front not
much wider than the width of the highway leading to Eindhoven. As night came, the British stopped in
Valkenswaard, their "formal" objective. Eindhoven remained six miles to the north.
The 506th Parachute Infantry fought through ineffective delaying actions by small enemy groups and pressed
the advance on Eindhoven early on D plus 1, 18 September. By midmorning, the lead battalion knocked out
a nest of two 88-mm guns and pushed deep into the heart of the city. Col. Sink expected to find at least a
regiment of Germans in Eindhoven; he actually encountered no more than a company. Having taken four
bridges over the Dommel River and a canal in the city by noon, the paratroopers spent the rest of the day
rounding up enemy stragglers and clearing the southern outskirts in preparation of the Guards Armoured
Division. As they performed these tasks, Eindhoven went on a binge. As if by magic the city blossomed with
the national color. "The reception was terrific," said one American officer. "The air seemed to reek with hate
for the Germans . . . ."
In the carnival atmosphere the paratroopers failed for a long time to hear the fretted clank of tanks. At 1130
the first direct radio communication with the Guards Armoured Division revealed that the armor was still five
miles south of Eindhoven, engaged in a bitter fight. At 1230 hopes rose when two British armored cars
appeared, but these had gone around the German flank to reach Eindhoven from the northwest. About 1900
the paratroopers spotted the head of the main British column.
The Guards Armoured Division pushed through Eindhoven without pause. When the column reached Zon,
British engineers immediately began construction of a Bailey bridge to replace the destroyed bridge over the
Wilhelmina Canal. At 0645 on D plus 2, 19 September, the armor rumbled across. Although the advance of
XXX Corps proceeded swiftly it was at least thirty-three hours behind schedule.
General Poppe's 59th Division was the German unit defending Best. The First Parachute Army's General
Student sent the bulk of the 59th Division to secure the bridges near Best. In the meantime, three companies
reinforced by two replacement battalions and a police battalion were sent to cut Hell's Highway at St.
Oedenrode.
The 2nd Battalion, 502nd PIR tried to push to the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal but had to fall back to a
defense with Col. Cole's battalion on the edge of the Zonsche Forest. A timely strike by a flight of P-47s held
the Germans back. During this action, a German sniper killed Lt. Col. Cole as he hastened from his covered
position to direct the emplacement of identification panels for the P-47s which initially strafed 3d Battalion’s
positions.
All through the day of D plus 1 the sound of firing had fanned hope of relief in the minds of Lieutenant
Wierzbowski and his group of fifteen men along the dike near the highway bridge. Then, at 1100, the hundred-
foot concrete span over the Wilhelmina Canal trembled and lifted with a violent explosion. The objective for
which the 502nd Parachute Infantry continued to fight the rest of the day was no longer of value.
The experiences of Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his little group were a testimonial to the kind of hardship
small, isolated units sometimes are called upon to endure. In midafternoon their troubles increased when a
small German force attacked. Two German bullets hit the platoon's lead scout, Pfc. Joe E. Mann, who already
had incurred two wounds; now both his arms hung useless. Though an engineer lieutenant and a sergeant
tried to break through for aid, the lieutenant was captured and the sergeant wounded.
Hope stirred again during the late afternoon and early evening. First, a British armored car and a
reconnaissance car appeared on the opposite bank of the canal. The British tried to raise headquarters of the
101st Airborne Division on their radio, but to no avail. They provided fire support until later in the evening
when a platoon of paratroopers who had gotten lost stumbled onto Lieutenant Wierzbowski's position.
Although this platoon agreed to defend one of Lieutenant Wierzbowski's flanks, the men fell back during the
night in the face of a small German attack. Again Wierzbowski and his little group were alone. Lt.
Wierzbowski sent word of his situation back with a small patrol from 2nd Battalion that stumbled into his
position. Though the lieutenant sent word of his plight with this patrol, the report did not reach Lt. Col.
Chappuis until the next morning. Distorted in transmission, the message said only that the bridge had been
blown.
As a misty daylight began to break on D Plus 2, 19 September, Lieutenant Wierzbowski spotted a small
German force bearing down on his position. Though the lieutenant yelled an alarm, the Germans already were
too close. Two German grenades rolled down among the wounded. Although the men tossed these out before
they exploded, another hit the machine gun and blinded the gunner. A moment later another grenade rolled
into this man's foxhole. One eye blown out entirely, the other blinded, the soldier groped wildly for the
grenade. He found it and tossed it from his foxhole only a split second before it exploded.
Another grenade fell behind Private Mann, who was sitting in a trench with six other wounded. Mann saw the
grenade come and felt it land behind him. Helpless, his arms bound and useless from the wounds incurred the
day before, he yelled: "Grenade!" Then he lay back to take the explosion with his body.
"Shall we surrender or fight?" the men had asked persistently. As the Germans made a final charge,
Lieutenant Wierzbowski gave them a succinct answer: "OK. This is the time." Only three of his men had gone
unscathed. They had exhausted their supply of ammunition and grenades. One man put a dirty handkerchief
on a rifle and waved it.
In the meantime, a stalemate had developed in the fighting along the edge of the Zonsche Forest. Though 2nd
and 3nd and Battalions held their own, Col. Michaelis, could not reinforce them without neglecting defense of
St. Oedenrode, which was one of his primary missions.
The solution came at last in the juncture with the British ground troops, whereby a squadron of British tanks
and a modicum of artillery support became available. Arrival by glider in the afternoon of D plus 1 of two
battalions of the 327th Glider Infantry under Col. Joseph H. Harper also helped. Because of rain and mist
along the southern air route, this glider lift had come in via the northern route and brought successful landing of
428 out of 450 gliders of the 101st Airborne Division. A total of 2,579 men, 146 jeeps, 109 trailers, 2
bulldozers, and some resupply had arrived.
General Taylor ordered his assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, to take over-all
command of the two battalions of the 502nd Parachute Infantry near Best, contingents of the 327th Glider
Infantry, a squadron of British tanks, and elements of British artillery and to reduce all enemy east of the
highway between Eindhoven and Hertogenbosch and north of the Wilhelmina Canal. Though the destruction
of the Best highway bridge had eliminated the original purpose of the Best fighting, the job of protecting the
west flank of the 101st Airborne Division remained.
The British tanks made the difference in an attack that began at 1400 on D plus 2. Within German ranks, a
festering disintegration by late afternoon became a rout. "Send us all the MP's available," became the cry as
hundreds of Germans began to surrender. For almost three days a bitter, costly, and frustrating fight, the
action at Best was now little more than a mop-up. By the end of D plus 2 the prisoners totaled more than
1,400 with more than 300 enemy dead. Some of the prisoners came in with Lieutenant Wierzbowski and the
survivors of his little band. They had been taken to a German aid station and there had talked their captors
into surrender.
Best itself remained in German hands, and much of the territory taken was abandoned as soon as the mop-
up ended. Now the battle of Hell's Highway was developing into the Indian-type fighting General Taylor later
was to call it, and these men from Best were needed at other points. The engagement near Best had been
costly and had secured neither of the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal, yet it had destroyed the 59th
Division which could have affected the security of Hell’s Highway if left intact.
While the fight raged at Best on D plus 1 and 2, the rest of the 101st Airborne Division maintained defensive
positions at Eindhoven, Zon, St. Oedenrode, and Veghel. From Eindhoven, Col. Sink's 506th Parachute
Infantry sent a battalion to both flanks to widen the base of the MARKET-GARDEN corridor, but in both cases
Sink recalled the troops before they reached their objectives. On the west the battalion returned because the
XII British Corps had begun to advance along the left flank of the corridor and was expected soon to overrun
the battalion's objective. The battalion on the east returned because Col. Sink learned that a column of
German armor was loose in the region and he wanted no part of a meeting engagement with armor.
Late in the afternoon of D Plus 2, the 107th Panzer Brigade struck toward Zon in an attempt to sever the thin
lifeline over which the British ground column was pushing toward Nijmegen. Even without the 59th Division,
the German attack came close to succeeding. Only a scratch force that included General Taylor's
headquarters troops was available at the time for defending the Bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at
Zon. Darkness had fallen, a British truck struck by a round from a German tank was burning brightly atop the
bridge, and a German Panther tank pumped round after round into the building which housed the division
command post when General Taylor himself arrived with reinforcements. He led part of a glider infantry
battalion and a lone 57-mm antitank gun. One of the first rounds from the 57-mm knocked out a German tank
near the bridge. Bazooka fire disabled another. The Germans appeared to lose heart after losing two tanks
and withdrew. Traffic gradually began to flow again along Hell's Highway.
Another German blow against Hell's Highway on D plus 2 came from the air, perhaps as a direct result of
Hitler's exhortations that the Luftwaffe put his little world right again. About a hundred German twin-engine
bombers came out of hiding after nightfall to bombard the central part of Eindhoven. Because most American
units held positions outside the city, they incurred no damage; but more than a thousand civilians were killed
or wounded, and British units were heavily hit. Whether from lack of planes, fuel, or trained crewmen, or
because of all three, this was the only major strike by long-range German bombers during the course of the
campaign in the West during the fall of 1944.
stretching out into nowhere from their gliders. Because the glider pilots could not detect when their mother
planes banked, many gliders turned over and had to cut loose prematurely. The Air/Sea Rescue Service
worked overtime plucking ditched crewmen and passengers from the Channel. Many planes and gliders
turned back. On the other hand, weather at German bases must have been better; for the Germans sent up
more than 125 Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs. A total of 1,086 Allied troop carrier, tow, and resupply
planes and 428 gliders took off on D plus 2. A large part of these returned to base, while 45 planes and 73
gliders were lost.
Because the 101st Airborne Division's landing zone was relatively secure, General Brereton allotted General
Taylor, at the expense of the 82nd Airborne Division, 384 gliders for the D plus 2 flight, more than twice the
number originally planned. Only 212 of these arrived. After missing the landing zone and circling vainly, 82
tow planes returned to England. Of these planes 31 of their gliders cut loose behind friendly lines, 16 were
known to have crash-landed in enemy territory, and 26 were not accounted for. Those glidermen who landed
behind German lines and eventually rejoined their units brought with them harrowing tales of hairbreadth
escapes punctuated with praise for the Dutch underground. Most of these men were artillerymen, for the
flights bringing in the artillery units were particularly cut up. Of 66 artillery pieces and antitank guns that started
the flight, only 36 arrived. None was larger than the 75-mm pack howitzer; all planes towing gliders with 105-
mm howitzers had to turn back.
Difficulties imposed on the 101st Airborne Division by the adverse weather could not be ignored, and
General Taylor's "Indian War" to keep open Hell's Highway was critical as long as men and supplies had to
go north over the highway. Nevertheless, at the moment, a situation had developed farther north that
overshadowed events along Hell's Highway. Moving on Grave and Nijmegen, the British ground column was
hard pressed to cross the Maas and Waal Rivers and reach the British airborne troops at Arnhem. To ensure
passage of the ground column, the 82nd Airborne Division at Nijmegen was fighting against time.
For all the adversities north of the Neder Rijn, hope still existed as daylight came on D plus 5, 22 September,
that the 43rd Infantry Division might break through at Ressen, relieve the British paratroopers, and bring over-
all success to Operation MARKET-GARDEN. The XXX Corps commander, General Horrocks, ordered the
division "to take all risks to effect relief today."
Yet, almost coincident with this hope, another major threat to the success of the operation was developing to
the south in the sector of General Taylor's 101st Airborne Division. Despite an aggressive defense designed
to prevent the enemy from concentrating at any one crucial spot to cut Hell's Highway, General Taylor on 22
September faced report after report from Dutch sources of large-scale German movements against the
narrow corridor from both east and west.
The 101st Airborne Division commander, General Taylor, had recognized since late on D plus 2, 19
September, when his command post and the Bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon had almost
fallen to the first strike of the 107th Panzer Brigade, that his division had entered a second and more difficult
phase of the fighting. The point was underscored in the morning mist of D plus 3, 20 September, when the
107th Panzer Brigade struck again at the Zon bridge. Though a reinforced battalion of infantry was positioned
to protect the bridge, German tank guns soon controlled the bridge by fire. The bridge might have fallen to the
Germans had not ten British tanks belatedly responded to an SOS dating from the crisis of the night before.
Knocking out four German tanks, the British forced the enemy back.
Recognizing that he had not the strength to maintain a static defense along the 15-mile length of Hell's
Highway, General Taylor on D plus 3 chose to conduct limited offensive operations to keep the Germans off
balance.
On D plus 4, 21 September, a reconnaissance by a company of Col. Michaelis' 502nd Parachute Infantry
encountered stiff resistance near the village of Schijndel, four and one half miles northwest of St. Oedenrode.
This coincided with civilian reports that the Germans were concentrating south of Schijndel for a counterattack
upon St. Oedenrode. Col. Michaelis and the commander of the 501st Parachute Infantry, Col. Johnson,
decided to press the Germans near Schijndel between them. Two battalions of Johnson's regiment would
take Schijndel from the north. Thereupon two of Michaelis' battalions would attack northward against the
German force that was south of the village.
In a swift move after dark on D plus 4, Col. Johnson took Schijndel not long after midnight on 21 September.
Although a surprise counterattack against the village at dawn delayed the start of the second phase of the
planned maneuver, Col. Michaelis' two battalions were able to begin their role by midmorning of D plus 5 on
22 September. Progressing smoothly, the attack gave promise of bountiful success. Then, abruptly, at 1430,
an urgent message from General Taylor forced a halt.
General Taylor had learned that the Germans were concentrating for a major blow to sever Hell's Highway in
the vicinity of Veghel and Uden. The maneuver near Schijndel during the morning of 22 September was
occupying the bulk of Col. Johnson's 501st Parachute Infantry, but one battalion of that regiment still was in
defensive positions in Veghel. Yet not a man was in Uden, the other place which the Americans believed the
Germans would strike. General Taylor shifted his efforts to controlling Uden.
The Battalion Jungwirth joined the fight to cut Hell’s Highway and moved down a secondary road and by
nightfall approached the hamlet of Koevering, located astride Hell's Highway a little more than a third of the
distance from St. Oedenrode to Veghel and heretofore unoccupied by the Americans. Upon receiving
reports of this enemy movement, the commander of 1st Battalion, 502nd Parachute Infantry at St. Oedenrode
sent two companies racing toward Koevering. Arriving minutes ahead of the Germans, these companies
denied the village; but they could not prevent Battalion Jungwirth from cutting Hell's Highway a few hundred
yards to the northeast.
Through the night airborne and British artillery pounded the point of German penetration in an attempt to
prevent reinforcement. The 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion in firing positions only 400 yards from the
Germans laid the guns of one battery for direct fire, operated the others with skeleton crews, and put the rest
of the artillerymen in foxholes as riflemen. Yet the commander of the 6th Parachute Regiment, still managed
to redeploy a portion of his forces to the point of penetration.
Marching during the night from Uden in a heavy rain, Col. Sink's 506th Parachute Infantry attacked at 0830 the
next morning (D plus 8, 25 September) to squeeze the Germans from the northeast. A regiment of the 50th
British Infantry Division and a reinforced battalion of the 502d Parachute Infantry pressed at the same time
from the direction of St. Oedenrode. As the day wore on, Battalion Jungwirth and reinforcements from the 6th
Parachute Regiment held firm. By nightfall the Allies had drawn a noose about the Germans on three sides,
but a small segment of Hell's Highway still was in German hands.
During the night Battalion Jungwirth withdrew in apparent recognition of the tenuous nature of the position.
The Germans nevertheless had held the penetration long enough to mine the highway extensively. Not until
well into the day of D plus 9, 26 September, did engineers finally clear the road and open Hell's Highway
again to traffic.
The elimination of this break near Koevering marked the stabilization of the 101st Airborne Division's front.
Although the Germans struck time after time in varying strength at various positions along the road, never
again were they able to cut it. Actually, General Reinhard's LXXXVIII Corps to the west of the highway
concentrated primarily upon interfering with Allied movements through artillery fire, and General von
Obstfelder's LXXXVI Corps to the east was too concerned with advance of the VIII British Corps to pay much
more attention to Hell's Highway. By nightfall of 25 September patrols of the VIII Corps had contacted
contingents of the XXX Corps at St. Antonis, south of Nijmegen, thereby presaging quick formation of a solid
line along the east flank of the corridor. Both General Taylor's 101st Airborne Division and General Gavin's
82d Airborne Division would defend in place while the British tried to make the best of what had been
happening at Arnhem.
Before the two U.S. divisions jumped in Operation MARKET, General Eisenhower had approved their
participation with the stipulation that they be released as soon as ground forces could pass the positions they
had seized and occupied. This had led to an expectation that at least one of the divisions might be released
as early as forty-eight hours after the jump. Nevertheless, when the British Red Devils withdrew from north of
the Neder Rijn to signal the end of the airborne phase, both American divisions still were in the line.
By 9 October, the British had widened the waist of the corridor to about twenty-four miles. Thereupon, the 12
Corps assumed responsibility for the "island" between the Waal and the Neder Rijn in order to free the XXX
Corps for a projected drive against the Ruhr. Field Marshal Montgomery intended to strike southeast from
Nijmegen in order to clear the west bank of the Rhine and the western face of the Ruhr and converge with a
renewal of First Army's push against Cologne.
Even as October drew to an end and enemy pressure against the MARKET-GARDEN salient diminished, no
release came for the two U.S. divisions. Like the 101st Airborne Division, part of General Gavin's 82nd
moved northward onto the "island." Here the men huddled in shallow foxholes dug no more than three feet
deep lest they fill with water seepage. In an attempt to deceive the Germans into believing the Allies planned
another thrust northward, patrol after patrol probed the enemy lines.
On 2 October, General Eisenhower reminded Field Marshal Montgomery of the conditions under which use of
the U.S. divisions had been granted and pointed out that the maintenance of the divisions had been based on
that plan and that he contemplated using the two divisions about the middle of November. "To enable this to
be done," he said "at least one of these divisions should be released without delay, and the second one
within a reasonably short time thereafter."
Despite the letter of 2 October urging quick release of the American airborne divisions, General Eisenhower
was not unsympathetic to the British manpower problem. He knew that British Empire troops available in the
United Kingdom had long since been absorbed and that only in reinforcement from the Mediterranean
Theater, a long-range project, did the British have a hope of strengthening themselves. Even after
Montgomery decided in early October that his commitments were too great and enemy strength too imposing
to permit an immediate drive on the Ruhr, General Eisenhower did not press the issue of the airborne
divisions. Though relieved temporarily of the Ruhr offensive, the British had to attack westward to help the
Canadians open Antwerp. General Eisenhower had not underestimated the desirability of relieving the
airborne troops; rather, he saw from his vantage point as Supreme Commander the more critical need of the
21st Army Group. At a conference with his top commanders on 18 October in Brussels, he gave tacit
approval to the continued employment of the two U.S. divisions. They were to be released, he said, when the
Second Army completed its part in clearing the approaches to Antwerp.
September to 27 November, the Division lost 1,682 men.
airborne divisions, to drop in the vicinity of Grave, Nijmegen, and Arnhem to seize bridges over several
canals and the Maas, Waal (Rhine), and Neder Rijn Rivers. They were to open a corridor more than fifty miles
long leading from Eindhoven northward to Arnhem. Operation GARDEN, called for ground troops of the
ninety-nine miles. The main effort of the ground attack was to be made by the British XXX Corps. On either
flank the British VIII and XII Corps were to launch supporting attacks.
The 101st Airborne Division was responsible for a 15-mile segment road of narrow concrete and macadam
ribbon stretching northward and northeastward from Eindhoven in the direction of Grave. The men of the
101st would soon call that segment of road the nickname Hell’s Highway.
The objectives vital for subsequent passage of the British XXX Corps were located at intervals along the
entire 15-mile stretch of road. The division commander, Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, later compared the
situation to the early American West, where small garrisons had to contend with sudden Indian attacks at any
point along great stretches of vital railroad.
Recalling dispersion that had plagued the division in Normandy, General Taylor insisted upon drop zones
fairly close together, no matter how scattered the objectives. Two regimental drop zones and the division
landing zone were located near the center of the Division sector, west of Hell's Highway in a triangle marked
by the villages of Zon, St. Oedenrode, and Best. The 501st PIR, commanded by Col. Howard R. Johnson,
would drop to the north of the other regiments near Veghel onto Drop Zone “A” in order to seize rail and road
bridges over the Willems Canal and the Aa River. Gen Taylor ordered the 506th PIR, commanded by Col.
Robert F. Sink, to drop close to Zon onto Drop Zone “C”, secure the highway bridge over the Wilhelmina
Canal a few hundred yards south of Zon, and then march south on Eindhoven. Gen. Taylor tasked the 502nd
PIR, commanded by Col. John H. Michaelis, to land just north of the 506th onto Drop Zone “B”, guard both
drop zones and secure Landing Zone “W” for gliders, and to capture the road bridge over the Dommel River
at St. Oedenrode. Additionally, General Taylor tasked the 502nd to secure bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal
south of Best, four miles from Zon off the west flank of Hell's Highway in order to strengthen the over-all
position of the 101st. In order to meet Gen. Taylor’s intent, Col. Michaelis sent a company to these bridges.
- Beginning three minutes after H-Hour, at
1303, men and equipment began to descend
upon the parachute and glider landing
zones. Despite flak and small arms fire, only
one Pathfinder plane and two of the other
parachute aircraft of the 101st Airborne
Division failed to reach the drop zones,
although some planes went down after the
paratroopers had jumped. Incurring
casualties of less than two percent in
personnel and five percent in equipment. In
an hour and one half 6,769 men were on the
ground. Only 1st Battalion, 501st PIR and 1st
Battalion, 502nd PIR failed drop on their
planned drop zones.
- The mission called for the entire 502nd PIR
to drop on Drop Zone “B” which was the
northernmost of the two drop zones between
Zon and St. Oedenrode; 1st Battalion,
delayed by this misadventure, by nightfall had brought a persistent bunch of rear echelon Germans to heel in
St. Oedenrode and thereby secured both a main highway and an alternate bridge over the Dommel River.
After deploying troopers to defend the village, Lt. Col. Cassidy sent a patrol northeast along Hell's Highway
which contacted the 501st Parachute Infantry at Veghel.
The majority of the 502nd moved to an assembly area near Zon as the Division reserve. At the same time a
H Company, 3rd Battalion reinforced by a light machine gun section from battalion headquarters and 3rd
Platoon, C Company, 326th Engineer Regiment .proceeded upon a separate mission, to capture the rail and
road bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal southeast of Best. Although these bridges were not assigned
objectives for the 101st Airborne Division, General Taylor considered them valuable for three reasons: first,
as an outpost protecting his glider landing zone and his main positions along Hell's Highway; again, as
alternate crossings of the Wilhelmina Canal should the Germans destroy the bridges at Zon; and again, as
control of a main highway (between Eindhoven and Hertogenbosch) by which the Germans otherwise might
feed reinforcements to Eindhoven. To do the job, Col. Michaelis sent Company H.
En route to the bridges, the H Company Commander, Capt. Robert E. Jones, lost his way in the densely
wooded Zonsche Forest. Emerging near a road junction southeast of Best, the company came under fire
from a small group of Germans. The Germans gained the upper hand when infantry reinforcements and
several small cannon arrived by truck from the direction of Hertogenbosch.
Goaded by radio messages from Lt. Col. Cole to secure the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal, Capt. Jones
organized a reinforced patrol. Lt. Edward L. Wierzbowski took his rifle platoon, the attached engineer platoon,
and attached light machine gun section to the bridges.
Lieutenant Wierzbowski found in turn that casualties and disorganization had left him with only eighteen
riflemen and twenty-six engineers. Lt. Wierzbowski’s reinforced patrol was picking its way through the
Zonsche Forest toward the bridges when night came with a cold, penetrating rain.
Based on stiff resistance north of Best encountered by H Company, Col. Michaelis directed Lt. Col. Robert G.
Cole to take his 3rd Battalion to Captain Jones's assistance. The remainder of 3rd Battalion started toward
Best at 1800, but darkness fell before they could establish physical contact with Captain Jones.
In the meantime, Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his men had crawled the last few yards on their bellies to reach
the Wilhelmina Canal several hundred yards east of the highway bridge. Slithering along the dike, the men
approached the bridge, apparently undetected. While the lieutenant and a scout crawled ahead to
reconnoiter, the main body of the patrol slid down the embankment to await their return.
A barrage of "potato masher" hand grenades came suddenly from the darkness on the other side of the
canal. Scared, a couple of men scrambled up the bank of the dike. Others followed. The night erupted with the
fire of machine guns and rifles. Some of the men stampeded back toward the forest.
When he heard the firing, Lt. Wierzbowski was within sight of the bridge and found it covered by German
sentries. Scurrying back, he discovered he only had 3 officers and 15 men remaining, and 3 of these were
wounded. Collectively they had their individual weapons, a machine gun with 500 rounds of ammunition, a
mortar with 6 rounds, and a bazooka with 5 rockets. As the cold rain fell, the men dug in for the night.
As these events developed, the 101st Airborne Division's D-Day glider lift began to arrive. Although not as
immune to mishap as the parachutists, a total of 53 out of 70 gliders landed successfully with 32 jeeps, 13
trailers, and 252 men. Of those that failed to make it, 1 fell in the Channel, 1 crash-landed on the landing zone,
2 collided in the air above the landing zone, 2 were unaccounted for, 4 landed in friendly territory, and 7 came
down behind enemy lines.
In Zon, the 506th PIR failed to secure the highway bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal before the Germans
demolished the bridge. Destruction of the bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal in Zon increased the importance
of the 502nd PIR’s mission of securing alternate bridges in Best.
On early D plus 1, 18 September, Col. Michaelis committed 2nd Battalion to the Best fight. The fight for the
bridges near Best developed into the 101st Airborne Division's stiffest fighting on D plus 1 and 2.
Behind an artillery barrage that began an hour after the first troop carrier aircraft passed over the British lines,
the XXX Corps had attacked on schedule with tanks in the lead. Against five German battalions, including
two SS battalions that XXX Corps intelligence had failed to detect, the spearhead Guards Armoured Division
made steady progress. The woods and marshy ground along the highway limited the attack to a front not
much wider than the width of the highway leading to Eindhoven. As night came, the British stopped in
Valkenswaard, their "formal" objective. Eindhoven remained six miles to the north.
The 506th Parachute Infantry fought through ineffective delaying actions by small enemy groups and pressed
the advance on Eindhoven early on D plus 1, 18 September. By midmorning, the lead battalion knocked out
a nest of two 88-mm guns and pushed deep into the heart of the city. Col. Sink expected to find at least a
regiment of Germans in Eindhoven; he actually encountered no more than a company. Having taken four
bridges over the Dommel River and a canal in the city by noon, the paratroopers spent the rest of the day
rounding up enemy stragglers and clearing the southern outskirts in preparation of the Guards Armoured
Division. As they performed these tasks, Eindhoven went on a binge. As if by magic the city blossomed with
the national color. "The reception was terrific," said one American officer. "The air seemed to reek with hate
for the Germans . . . ."
In the carnival atmosphere the paratroopers failed for a long time to hear the fretted clank of tanks. At 1130
the first direct radio communication with the Guards Armoured Division revealed that the armor was still five
miles south of Eindhoven, engaged in a bitter fight. At 1230 hopes rose when two British armored cars
appeared, but these had gone around the German flank to reach Eindhoven from the northwest. About 1900
the paratroopers spotted the head of the main British column.
The Guards Armoured Division pushed through Eindhoven without pause. When the column reached Zon,
British engineers immediately began construction of a Bailey bridge to replace the destroyed bridge over the
Wilhelmina Canal. At 0645 on D plus 2, 19 September, the armor rumbled across. Although the advance of
XXX Corps proceeded swiftly it was at least thirty-three hours behind schedule.
General Poppe's 59th Division was the German unit defending Best. The First Parachute Army's General
Student sent the bulk of the 59th Division to secure the bridges near Best. In the meantime, three companies
reinforced by two replacement battalions and a police battalion were sent to cut Hell's Highway at St.
Oedenrode.
The 2nd Battalion, 502nd PIR tried to push to the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal but had to fall back to a
defense with Col. Cole's battalion on the edge of the Zonsche Forest. A timely strike by a flight of P-47s held
the Germans back. During this action, a German sniper killed Lt. Col. Cole as he hastened from his covered
position to direct the emplacement of identification panels for the P-47s which initially strafed 3d Battalion’s
positions.
All through the day of D plus 1 the sound of firing had fanned hope of relief in the minds of Lieutenant
Wierzbowski and his group of fifteen men along the dike near the highway bridge. Then, at 1100, the hundred-
foot concrete span over the Wilhelmina Canal trembled and lifted with a violent explosion. The objective for
which the 502nd Parachute Infantry continued to fight the rest of the day was no longer of value.
The experiences of Lieutenant Wierzbowski and his little group were a testimonial to the kind of hardship
small, isolated units sometimes are called upon to endure. In midafternoon their troubles increased when a
small German force attacked. Two German bullets hit the platoon's lead scout, Pfc. Joe E. Mann, who already
had incurred two wounds; now both his arms hung useless. Though an engineer lieutenant and a sergeant
tried to break through for aid, the lieutenant was captured and the sergeant wounded.
Hope stirred again during the late afternoon and early evening. First, a British armored car and a
reconnaissance car appeared on the opposite bank of the canal. The British tried to raise headquarters of the
101st Airborne Division on their radio, but to no avail. They provided fire support until later in the evening
when a platoon of paratroopers who had gotten lost stumbled onto Lieutenant Wierzbowski's position.
Although this platoon agreed to defend one of Lieutenant Wierzbowski's flanks, the men fell back during the
night in the face of a small German attack. Again Wierzbowski and his little group were alone. Lt.
Wierzbowski sent word of his situation back with a small patrol from 2nd Battalion that stumbled into his
position. Though the lieutenant sent word of his plight with this patrol, the report did not reach Lt. Col.
Chappuis until the next morning. Distorted in transmission, the message said only that the bridge had been
blown.
As a misty daylight began to break on D Plus 2, 19 September, Lieutenant Wierzbowski spotted a small
German force bearing down on his position. Though the lieutenant yelled an alarm, the Germans already were
too close. Two German grenades rolled down among the wounded. Although the men tossed these out before
they exploded, another hit the machine gun and blinded the gunner. A moment later another grenade rolled
into this man's foxhole. One eye blown out entirely, the other blinded, the soldier groped wildly for the
grenade. He found it and tossed it from his foxhole only a split second before it exploded.
Another grenade fell behind Private Mann, who was sitting in a trench with six other wounded. Mann saw the
grenade come and felt it land behind him. Helpless, his arms bound and useless from the wounds incurred the
day before, he yelled: "Grenade!" Then he lay back to take the explosion with his body.
"Shall we surrender or fight?" the men had asked persistently. As the Germans made a final charge,
Lieutenant Wierzbowski gave them a succinct answer: "OK. This is the time." Only three of his men had gone
unscathed. They had exhausted their supply of ammunition and grenades. One man put a dirty handkerchief
on a rifle and waved it.
In the meantime, a stalemate had developed in the fighting along the edge of the Zonsche Forest. Though 2nd
and 3nd and Battalions held their own, Col. Michaelis, could not reinforce them without neglecting defense of
St. Oedenrode, which was one of his primary missions.
The solution came at last in the juncture with the British ground troops, whereby a squadron of British tanks
and a modicum of artillery support became available. Arrival by glider in the afternoon of D plus 1 of two
battalions of the 327th Glider Infantry under Col. Joseph H. Harper also helped. Because of rain and mist
along the southern air route, this glider lift had come in via the northern route and brought successful landing of
428 out of 450 gliders of the 101st Airborne Division. A total of 2,579 men, 146 jeeps, 109 trailers, 2
bulldozers, and some resupply had arrived.
General Taylor ordered his assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. Gerald J. Higgins, to take over-all
command of the two battalions of the 502nd Parachute Infantry near Best, contingents of the 327th Glider
Infantry, a squadron of British tanks, and elements of British artillery and to reduce all enemy east of the
highway between Eindhoven and Hertogenbosch and north of the Wilhelmina Canal. Though the destruction
of the Best highway bridge had eliminated the original purpose of the Best fighting, the job of protecting the
west flank of the 101st Airborne Division remained.
The British tanks made the difference in an attack that began at 1400 on D plus 2. Within German ranks, a
festering disintegration by late afternoon became a rout. "Send us all the MP's available," became the cry as
hundreds of Germans began to surrender. For almost three days a bitter, costly, and frustrating fight, the
action at Best was now little more than a mop-up. By the end of D plus 2 the prisoners totaled more than
1,400 with more than 300 enemy dead. Some of the prisoners came in with Lieutenant Wierzbowski and the
survivors of his little band. They had been taken to a German aid station and there had talked their captors
into surrender.
Best itself remained in German hands, and much of the territory taken was abandoned as soon as the mop-
up ended. Now the battle of Hell's Highway was developing into the Indian-type fighting General Taylor later
was to call it, and these men from Best were needed at other points. The engagement near Best had been
costly and had secured neither of the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal, yet it had destroyed the 59th
Division which could have affected the security of Hell’s Highway if left intact.
While the fight raged at Best on D plus 1 and 2, the rest of the 101st Airborne Division maintained defensive
positions at Eindhoven, Zon, St. Oedenrode, and Veghel. From Eindhoven, Col. Sink's 506th Parachute
Infantry sent a battalion to both flanks to widen the base of the MARKET-GARDEN corridor, but in both cases
Sink recalled the troops before they reached their objectives. On the west the battalion returned because the
XII British Corps had begun to advance along the left flank of the corridor and was expected soon to overrun
the battalion's objective. The battalion on the east returned because Col. Sink learned that a column of
German armor was loose in the region and he wanted no part of a meeting engagement with armor.
Late in the afternoon of D Plus 2, the 107th Panzer Brigade struck toward Zon in an attempt to sever the thin
lifeline over which the British ground column was pushing toward Nijmegen. Even without the 59th Division,
the German attack came close to succeeding. Only a scratch force that included General Taylor's
headquarters troops was available at the time for defending the Bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at
Zon. Darkness had fallen, a British truck struck by a round from a German tank was burning brightly atop the
bridge, and a German Panther tank pumped round after round into the building which housed the division
command post when General Taylor himself arrived with reinforcements. He led part of a glider infantry
battalion and a lone 57-mm antitank gun. One of the first rounds from the 57-mm knocked out a German tank
near the bridge. Bazooka fire disabled another. The Germans appeared to lose heart after losing two tanks
and withdrew. Traffic gradually began to flow again along Hell's Highway.
Another German blow against Hell's Highway on D plus 2 came from the air, perhaps as a direct result of
Hitler's exhortations that the Luftwaffe put his little world right again. About a hundred German twin-engine
bombers came out of hiding after nightfall to bombard the central part of Eindhoven. Because most American
units held positions outside the city, they incurred no damage; but more than a thousand civilians were killed
or wounded, and British units were heavily hit. Whether from lack of planes, fuel, or trained crewmen, or
because of all three, this was the only major strike by long-range German bombers during the course of the
campaign in the West during the fall of 1944.
- Lt. Col. Cassidy's 1st Battalion, 502nd PIR held their position about the
canal and river bridges against persistent but small German attacks, most
of which were in company strength. The strongest—by three companies of
the 59th Division reinforced by police and replacement units—struck 1st
Battalion on D plus 2 on the road to Schijndel. Hard pressed at first, Lt.
Col. Cassidy's men gained assistance from Sgt. James M. “Paddy”
McCrory, commander of a crippled tank that had dropped out of the British
ground column. Although the tank could make no more than five miles per
hour, McCrory plunged unhesitatingly into the fight. When the paratroopers
tried to thank him, he brushed them off. "When in doubt," Sergeant
McCrory said, "lash out." His words became a kind of unofficial motto of
the battalion.
- General Taylor had hoped to be in a stronger position by the end of D plus
2 with the addition of most of his airborne artillery. The flights on D plus 2
were postponed until late in the day on the chance the weather might
stretching out into nowhere from their gliders. Because the glider pilots could not detect when their mother
planes banked, many gliders turned over and had to cut loose prematurely. The Air/Sea Rescue Service
worked overtime plucking ditched crewmen and passengers from the Channel. Many planes and gliders
turned back. On the other hand, weather at German bases must have been better; for the Germans sent up
more than 125 Messerschmitts and Focke-Wulfs. A total of 1,086 Allied troop carrier, tow, and resupply
planes and 428 gliders took off on D plus 2. A large part of these returned to base, while 45 planes and 73
gliders were lost.
Because the 101st Airborne Division's landing zone was relatively secure, General Brereton allotted General
Taylor, at the expense of the 82nd Airborne Division, 384 gliders for the D plus 2 flight, more than twice the
number originally planned. Only 212 of these arrived. After missing the landing zone and circling vainly, 82
tow planes returned to England. Of these planes 31 of their gliders cut loose behind friendly lines, 16 were
known to have crash-landed in enemy territory, and 26 were not accounted for. Those glidermen who landed
behind German lines and eventually rejoined their units brought with them harrowing tales of hairbreadth
escapes punctuated with praise for the Dutch underground. Most of these men were artillerymen, for the
flights bringing in the artillery units were particularly cut up. Of 66 artillery pieces and antitank guns that started
the flight, only 36 arrived. None was larger than the 75-mm pack howitzer; all planes towing gliders with 105-
mm howitzers had to turn back.
Difficulties imposed on the 101st Airborne Division by the adverse weather could not be ignored, and
General Taylor's "Indian War" to keep open Hell's Highway was critical as long as men and supplies had to
go north over the highway. Nevertheless, at the moment, a situation had developed farther north that
overshadowed events along Hell's Highway. Moving on Grave and Nijmegen, the British ground column was
hard pressed to cross the Maas and Waal Rivers and reach the British airborne troops at Arnhem. To ensure
passage of the ground column, the 82nd Airborne Division at Nijmegen was fighting against time.
For all the adversities north of the Neder Rijn, hope still existed as daylight came on D plus 5, 22 September,
that the 43rd Infantry Division might break through at Ressen, relieve the British paratroopers, and bring over-
all success to Operation MARKET-GARDEN. The XXX Corps commander, General Horrocks, ordered the
division "to take all risks to effect relief today."
Yet, almost coincident with this hope, another major threat to the success of the operation was developing to
the south in the sector of General Taylor's 101st Airborne Division. Despite an aggressive defense designed
to prevent the enemy from concentrating at any one crucial spot to cut Hell's Highway, General Taylor on 22
September faced report after report from Dutch sources of large-scale German movements against the
narrow corridor from both east and west.
The 101st Airborne Division commander, General Taylor, had recognized since late on D plus 2, 19
September, when his command post and the Bailey bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Zon had almost
fallen to the first strike of the 107th Panzer Brigade, that his division had entered a second and more difficult
phase of the fighting. The point was underscored in the morning mist of D plus 3, 20 September, when the
107th Panzer Brigade struck again at the Zon bridge. Though a reinforced battalion of infantry was positioned
to protect the bridge, German tank guns soon controlled the bridge by fire. The bridge might have fallen to the
Germans had not ten British tanks belatedly responded to an SOS dating from the crisis of the night before.
Knocking out four German tanks, the British forced the enemy back.
Recognizing that he had not the strength to maintain a static defense along the 15-mile length of Hell's
Highway, General Taylor on D plus 3 chose to conduct limited offensive operations to keep the Germans off
balance.
On D plus 4, 21 September, a reconnaissance by a company of Col. Michaelis' 502nd Parachute Infantry
encountered stiff resistance near the village of Schijndel, four and one half miles northwest of St. Oedenrode.
This coincided with civilian reports that the Germans were concentrating south of Schijndel for a counterattack
upon St. Oedenrode. Col. Michaelis and the commander of the 501st Parachute Infantry, Col. Johnson,
decided to press the Germans near Schijndel between them. Two battalions of Johnson's regiment would
take Schijndel from the north. Thereupon two of Michaelis' battalions would attack northward against the
German force that was south of the village.
In a swift move after dark on D plus 4, Col. Johnson took Schijndel not long after midnight on 21 September.
Although a surprise counterattack against the village at dawn delayed the start of the second phase of the
planned maneuver, Col. Michaelis' two battalions were able to begin their role by midmorning of D plus 5 on
22 September. Progressing smoothly, the attack gave promise of bountiful success. Then, abruptly, at 1430,
an urgent message from General Taylor forced a halt.
General Taylor had learned that the Germans were concentrating for a major blow to sever Hell's Highway in
the vicinity of Veghel and Uden. The maneuver near Schijndel during the morning of 22 September was
occupying the bulk of Col. Johnson's 501st Parachute Infantry, but one battalion of that regiment still was in
defensive positions in Veghel. Yet not a man was in Uden, the other place which the Americans believed the
Germans would strike. General Taylor shifted his efforts to controlling Uden.
The Battalion Jungwirth joined the fight to cut Hell’s Highway and moved down a secondary road and by
nightfall approached the hamlet of Koevering, located astride Hell's Highway a little more than a third of the
distance from St. Oedenrode to Veghel and heretofore unoccupied by the Americans. Upon receiving
reports of this enemy movement, the commander of 1st Battalion, 502nd Parachute Infantry at St. Oedenrode
sent two companies racing toward Koevering. Arriving minutes ahead of the Germans, these companies
denied the village; but they could not prevent Battalion Jungwirth from cutting Hell's Highway a few hundred
yards to the northeast.
Through the night airborne and British artillery pounded the point of German penetration in an attempt to
prevent reinforcement. The 907th Glider Field Artillery Battalion in firing positions only 400 yards from the
Germans laid the guns of one battery for direct fire, operated the others with skeleton crews, and put the rest
of the artillerymen in foxholes as riflemen. Yet the commander of the 6th Parachute Regiment, still managed
to redeploy a portion of his forces to the point of penetration.
Marching during the night from Uden in a heavy rain, Col. Sink's 506th Parachute Infantry attacked at 0830 the
next morning (D plus 8, 25 September) to squeeze the Germans from the northeast. A regiment of the 50th
British Infantry Division and a reinforced battalion of the 502d Parachute Infantry pressed at the same time
from the direction of St. Oedenrode. As the day wore on, Battalion Jungwirth and reinforcements from the 6th
Parachute Regiment held firm. By nightfall the Allies had drawn a noose about the Germans on three sides,
but a small segment of Hell's Highway still was in German hands.
During the night Battalion Jungwirth withdrew in apparent recognition of the tenuous nature of the position.
The Germans nevertheless had held the penetration long enough to mine the highway extensively. Not until
well into the day of D plus 9, 26 September, did engineers finally clear the road and open Hell's Highway
again to traffic.
The elimination of this break near Koevering marked the stabilization of the 101st Airborne Division's front.
Although the Germans struck time after time in varying strength at various positions along the road, never
again were they able to cut it. Actually, General Reinhard's LXXXVIII Corps to the west of the highway
concentrated primarily upon interfering with Allied movements through artillery fire, and General von
Obstfelder's LXXXVI Corps to the east was too concerned with advance of the VIII British Corps to pay much
more attention to Hell's Highway. By nightfall of 25 September patrols of the VIII Corps had contacted
contingents of the XXX Corps at St. Antonis, south of Nijmegen, thereby presaging quick formation of a solid
line along the east flank of the corridor. Both General Taylor's 101st Airborne Division and General Gavin's
82d Airborne Division would defend in place while the British tried to make the best of what had been
happening at Arnhem.
Before the two U.S. divisions jumped in Operation MARKET, General Eisenhower had approved their
participation with the stipulation that they be released as soon as ground forces could pass the positions they
had seized and occupied. This had led to an expectation that at least one of the divisions might be released
as early as forty-eight hours after the jump. Nevertheless, when the British Red Devils withdrew from north of
the Neder Rijn to signal the end of the airborne phase, both American divisions still were in the line.
By 9 October, the British had widened the waist of the corridor to about twenty-four miles. Thereupon, the 12
Corps assumed responsibility for the "island" between the Waal and the Neder Rijn in order to free the XXX
Corps for a projected drive against the Ruhr. Field Marshal Montgomery intended to strike southeast from
Nijmegen in order to clear the west bank of the Rhine and the western face of the Ruhr and converge with a
renewal of First Army's push against Cologne.
Even as October drew to an end and enemy pressure against the MARKET-GARDEN salient diminished, no
release came for the two U.S. divisions. Like the 101st Airborne Division, part of General Gavin's 82nd
moved northward onto the "island." Here the men huddled in shallow foxholes dug no more than three feet
deep lest they fill with water seepage. In an attempt to deceive the Germans into believing the Allies planned
another thrust northward, patrol after patrol probed the enemy lines.
On 2 October, General Eisenhower reminded Field Marshal Montgomery of the conditions under which use of
the U.S. divisions had been granted and pointed out that the maintenance of the divisions had been based on
that plan and that he contemplated using the two divisions about the middle of November. "To enable this to
be done," he said "at least one of these divisions should be released without delay, and the second one
within a reasonably short time thereafter."
Despite the letter of 2 October urging quick release of the American airborne divisions, General Eisenhower
was not unsympathetic to the British manpower problem. He knew that British Empire troops available in the
United Kingdom had long since been absorbed and that only in reinforcement from the Mediterranean
Theater, a long-range project, did the British have a hope of strengthening themselves. Even after
Montgomery decided in early October that his commitments were too great and enemy strength too imposing
to permit an immediate drive on the Ruhr, General Eisenhower did not press the issue of the airborne
divisions. Though relieved temporarily of the Ruhr offensive, the British had to attack westward to help the
Canadians open Antwerp. General Eisenhower had not underestimated the desirability of relieving the
airborne troops; rather, he saw from his vantage point as Supreme Commander the more critical need of the
21st Army Group. At a conference with his top commanders on 18 October in Brussels, he gave tacit
approval to the continued employment of the two U.S. divisions. They were to be released, he said, when the
Second Army completed its part in clearing the approaches to Antwerp.
- The ordeal did not end for the 101st Airborne
Division until 25 November 1944. After 69
days since their parachute landing near Zon,
the first troops of General Taylor's division
began to withdraw. Two days later, on 27
November, D plus 71, the last American
paratroopers pulled off the dreaded "Island"
north of the Waal. Once relieved, the
Paratroopers of the 101st moved by truck
along the same route they fought for so
staunchly. In Nijmegen, Grave, Veghel, St.
Oedenrode, Zon, and Eindhoven, the newly
liberated Dutch people roared "September
17!" as the Paratroopers passed.
During the two phases of MARKET-
GARDEN the 101st Airborne Division
sustained significant casualties. In the
airborne phase, from 17 to 26 September
September to 27 November, the Division lost 1,682 men.
| Lt. Delmar Denson Idol of Able Company, 502nd PIR on a combat patrol near Dodewaard, Holland on the "Island" in October, 1944. Capt. Joe Pangerl German positions. |
| Invasion from the Sky Operation Market-Garden, 17-26 September 1944 The Siegfried Line Campaign, Charles B. MacDonald, Office of the Chief of Military History Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 1963, CMH Publication 7-7-1. |
| Paratroopers descended upon Holland during Operation MARKET-GARDEN |
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| Lt. Col. Cassidy |
| Contact us: info@ablecompany502pir.org |